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Abstract Urban landscape has been rapidly formed not only at the existing 
cities but also at towns in rural area of the Pearl River Delta region, Guangdong 
Province, China. This paper pays special attention to capital accumulation 
which has been initiated by land system reform, and tries to explain the 
mechanism of such urban formation in the region. Some cases in Shenzhen 
municipality are investigated here. Around 1980, local governments com-
menced land system reform in urban area and accumulated more capital, 
through charging for the conveyance of land use right of state-owned land. 
The accumulated capital has been used exclusively for further urban land 
development. In  rural area, local communities have accumulated land profits 
from the compensation of land expropriation and rent of collective-owned land, 
and promoted land development in their domains. While foreign enterprises 
aggressively invest in this region in pursuit of preferable location for their 
production, local communities in rural area as well as local government 
competitively develop their land and construct facilities on it in order to invite 
more foreign investment. As a result, these movements have brought about 
rapid changes of the landscape in the region.
Key  words  : land system reform, urban formation, Shenzhen, the Pearl River 
         Delta region, China
1 Introduction 
   As open door policy of economy is progressing, the Pearl River Delta region 
(PRD), Guangdong Province, China, adjoining Hong Kong as hinterland  (Fig.  1), 
changes its industrial structure and increases its population  dramaticallyn. At the 
same time, urban landscape such as factories, houses, shops, roads and other infras-
tructure has rapidly been formed there. The pattern of its urban formation is not 
necessarily the concentration of population to, nor the expansion of built-up area of 
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                      Fig. 1 The Pearl River Delta Region 
existing large cities, but the extended growth of small cities or towns (xiaochengzhen) 
which are mushrooming along the trunk roads connecting the towns and the larger 
 cities2). 
   The formation of such urban landscape has started since foreign enterprises which 
have footholds at Hong Kong transferred their labour-intensive production function 
into PRD in the 1980's. When many enterprises began to operate factories in the 
region, employment chances increased sharply, and the standard of wage rose in 
comparison with the rest of China. The result was that the region absorbed a large 
number of inmigrant workers (Onodera and Oshima, 1996). Some statistical data on 
the introduction of foreign capital show the shift of production function by foreign 
enterprises to PRD. The introduction of foreign capital to the region accounts for 
15.9% in 1985,  16.1% in 1990, and  19.2% in 1994 of all foreign investment to the whole 
China, 87% of which was direct investment in  19943). 
   The advance of foreign enterprises and the corresponding influx of workers to 
PRD have urged the construction of infrastructure, factories, and dormitories for the 
inmigrant workers. Along with them, public establishments, shops, and houses for 
local residents have also been increasing rapidly. They have been constructed partly 
by foreign enterprises but principally by local economic actors. Enough capital for
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these constructions should be accumulated locally. It is reasonable to think that 
foreign enterprises invest in the production activities in PRD such as processing 
materials and assembling parts, and try to collect profits for headquarters in Hong 
Kong or in other cities abroad. Yet, it is also highly possible that a part of foreign 
investment is accumulated in the region through some ways by some local economic 
actors and applied to the investment in fixed assets which make up urban landscape 
there. 
   This paper aims at exploring the mechanism of urban formation mentioned above, 
and focuses on land system reform including charging for the conveyance of land use 
right, which is the clue of capital accumulation by economic actors in the region. 
After surveying the features of old and new land systems and the process of the land 
system reform in the 1980's and the early 1990's (Chapter 2), this paper will investigate 
how the land profits are gained and invested in urban formation on urban state-owned 
land (Chapter 3) and on collective-owned land (Chapter 4), through taking reference to 
the cases in PRD or especially in Shenzhen municipality.
2 Land system reform 
2.1. Land system before reform 
   Socialist China has two types of  land  : one is urban state-owned land, the other is 
rural collective-owned  land  ; there is no  individual-owned land now. On the one 
hand, almost all urban land had been confiscated or redeemed by the state by the 1950's. 
On the other hand, through the land reform which begun soon after the founding of 
People's Republic of China, rural land was confiscated from landlords and rich farmers, 
and then redistributed to the poor peasants class. The land was owned individually at 
that moment. Afterward, going through agricultural cooperation and the organiza-
tion of People's Commune, rural land came to be owned and utilized collectively. 
   Before the commencement of new land system reform in the 1980's, urban land had 
the following problems. Enterprises did not get any stimulation to utilize land 
effectively, since urban land was administratively allocated by state to them, in other 
words, they could obtain land with no charge, occupy it exclusively, and be exempted 
from the payment of rent or tax. Because they would rather try to get and keep more 
land than they actually need, more land was stored idly, less multistory buildings were 
built, and then land use intensity was kept at low level (Li, 1986, p 32). As a general 
rule, government allocated land to meet user's necessity and withdrew it when the user 
does not need it any more. Disposing of land by sale or taking out a mortgage of it 
was never admitted. Consequently, land use was fixed and getting less and less 
effective. When land was allocated, basic facilities on the land were provided in 
correspondence with user's specific purpose on the assumption that the user would use
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the land exclusively for a long time. Afterwards even if other users hope to inherit 
the land to utilize, they have to spend much time and cost to reconstruct the basic 
facilities to fit to their purpose. This situation also discouraged users from exchang-
ing lands when they really need to do so (Tang, 1990, p. 7). Although urban land was 
owned by state in terms of the law, it was virtually owned by the user enterprises semi-
permanently. 
   Only after one got approval for his capital construction project successfully, he 
could apply for new land allocation to government. He could not freely obtain land 
without concrete land use plan. In this sense, there was not any land market. No one 
could expect any control function of land use by rent which should be decided in land 
market. It also might be difficult to carry out urban planning by the method of 
building regulations, because such regulations were often contrary to the vested 
interests of existing enterprises on the land. It is said that, under the coexistence of 
shortage of land in the whole city and surplus of land in some enterprises, there were 
black markets dealing for lands possessed by enterprises and owned by local commu-
nities in suburban area (Tang, 1990, pp. 23-24). 
   As for rural land, production teams were the  units of land ownership under the 
People's Commune system. They used their land collectively for fulfilling the duty of 
offering grain to state. The conversions of land use for non-agricultural activities, 
such as for residential use and for Commune-run or brigade-run enterprises, went 
through only within each local community (shequ), while the transfers of land to the 
outside of community were strictly limited to the case of land expropriation caused by 
capital construction project of government. 
   After the People's Commune system was abolished and the production responsibi-
lity system was introduced in the 1980's, land ownership was generally transferred 
from former production teams to administrative villages (former production brigade 
level). Farmers can now participate in the distribution of management right of 
agricultural land, through an economic organization of each local community which is 
usually called  `jingji hezuoshe' (economic association), on the condition that they are 
responsible for the duty of offering grain to state and the payment of agricultural tax. 
   Each Commune, production brigade and production team had already set up 
collective retention (jiti tiliu) of community, or community reserve, among which 
production team was the principal body for community reserve. However, admini-
strative village has played the most important role for community reserve since the 
introduction of the production responsibility system in place of natural village (former 
production  team)4'. The shift of main body of community reserve depends on which 
level of community controls its most important property of land. When administra-
tive villages control collective-owned land, it is necessary for them to retain their 
community reserve.
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   The way of  ̀ yi gong bu nong' (assisting agriculture by surplus from rural industry) 
is a good example of the practical use of community reserve. When they adopt 
 liangtianzhi' (two systems for cultivated land), the burden of offering grain to state 
tends to lean upon the cultivators of minor  `zerentian' (responsibility land), not upon 
the cultivators of major  louliangtian' (grain ration land) (He, 1993, p. 59). The burden 
of  `zerentian' could be made up for by community reserve,  which is mainly the  pool of 
surplus from their rural industries, for the purpose of keeping fair among the members 
of administrative village.
2.2. Process of reform 
   The allocation of urban land with no charge and with no term of use supported an 
industrial policy which aimed at reinforcing urban industrial production by reducing 
the cost of land. However, such land system made urban land use less effective, and 
moreover, it made government unable to collect profits from land and reserve them as 
funds for land development. The purposes of land system reform under these circum-
stances  are  : firstly to create land market through charging for land use, let land use 
rights circulate in the market and promote more effective land use, and secondly to find 
out new funds for land development through conveyance, lease and mortgage of land 
use  rights5). 
   For the present, it may be useful to look closely at two items in the process of land 
system reform. One is land use fee  (changdi shiyongfei' at first, or  `tudi shiyongfei' 
later), the other is conveyance price of land use right  (`tudi shiyongquan churangjin'). 
   For land use fee, the Law on Joint Venture Enterprise between Chinese and 
Foreign Investors of the People's Republic of China stipulated in July 1979,  'Chinese 
side can include land use right as investment which is offered to the joint venture 
enterprise during its management period', and, 'When land use right is not included as 
Chinese side's investment, the joint venture enterprise has to pay land use fee to 
Chinese government.' In fact, following the Regulations on the Urban Land Use 
Administration issued in November 1981, Shenzhen municipal government began to 
levy the fee in 1982 for the first time. Before long the range liable for the fee was 
enlarged from only foreign investment enterprises to all land users except public 
sectors (Institute of Finance and Trade Economics Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences and Institute of Public Administration New York U.S.A., 1992, p. 121). The levy 
of land use fee spread widely over China, and more than 100 cities levied it at the 
moment of 1988 (Kojima, 1996, p. 34). 
   Original purpose of land use fee was to collect rent of state-owned land. 
Nevertheless, domestic enterprises using land with no charge for a long time could not 
afford to start immediately to pay the rent every year, so that the standard of levy fell 
to a symbolic amount just telling that the ownership of the land belonged to the  state.
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Then total amount of levied land use fee was not enough at all as revenue of funds for 
urban land development. 
   Another item of charging for land was conveyance price of land use right, which 
was expected to solve revenue shortage instead of land use fee. As legal grounds, the 
amendments of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Law of Land 
Administration of the People's Republic of China in 1988 specified that land ownership 
and land use right are separated and that only land use right can be transferred with 
charge. Prior to these legal amendments, the conveyance of land use right with 
charge started in the ways of negotiation, tender and auction for the first time in 1987 
in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The Regulations on Land Administration 
of Shenzhen SEZ provided in the next year that an acquisitor of land had to pay land 
value within a certain period of time whose amount was decided by one of the three 
ways of conveyance. As the chief of Shenzhen Municipal Land Bureau stated, 
Shenzhen government in truth followed the way of Hong Kong government to issue 
leasehold of crown land through competitive tender and to invest the profits from land 
to the construction of urban infrastructure (Wang, 1991, p. 6). 
   After Shenzhen's experiment, some cities in the coastal area where foreign direct 
investment is brisk have promulgated the regulations on land transfer one after 
another (Kojima, 1996, p. 34). In May 1990, the Provisional Regulations upon Convey-
ance and Transfer of Urban State-Owned Land Use Right of the People's Republic of 
China and the Provisional Administrative Measure concerning Comprehensive Land 
Development and Management by Foreign Investors of the People's Republic of China 
were issued. The former regulated the procedures of land transfers with charge, and 
the latter proposed the promotion of comprehensive land development through foreign 
investment. With these laws' promulgation, the transfers of land right use with 
charge came to be executed generally and widely. 
   Shenzhen government imposes comparably low land use fee (Type A) on the users 
who obtained land use right with charge, while it imposes more than ten times higher 
fee (Type B) on the users who have allocated land with no charge. This policy intends 
to gradually collect the unpaid rent of allocated land and press the land users to go 
through the formalities for conveyance with charge as soon as possible (Shi and Zhu, 
1996, p. 19). The purpose of the conveyance of land use right with charge is to collect 
rent, whereas the role of land use fee is to adjust imperfect part of rent collection. In 
the background of this policy, there is an idea that state should receive not only 
absolute rent but also differential rent of urban land because state invests in urban 
infrastructure, and that, if state fails to levy the rent of urban land, it leads to the 
outflow of national property (Luo, 1996, p. 26).
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2.3. Features of reform 
   Judging from the process of land system reform, we can point out the following 
features of the reform. First of all, local government rather than central government 
has taken initiative in executing the policy of charging for land. Each local govern-
ment carries out its own reform positively in advance of the issue of laws by the 
central government. Profits from charging for land were shared between central and 
local governments at  first  ; 40% of the profits fell to central government and 60% to 
local. After local governments actually needed more funds for urban construction 
and clamorously opposed to the central government, the share of central government 
gradually decreased. Local government reserves  100% of its land profits nowadays 
(Jiang, 1995, p. 8). 
   For the same reason, some local governments refuse conversions from land use fee 
and land appreciation fee (tudi zengzhifei) to taxes. The Provisional Regulations 
upon Urban Land Use Tax of the People's Republic of China in September 1988 
provided that land use fee by that time was incorporated in tax system. But, because 
it prescribed the tax revenue should be shared half-and-half between central and local 
governments, about half of local governments in the country avoid the reduction of 
their revenue by central control and do not follow the Provisional  Regulations7. 
Shenzhen government also continues to levy land use fee, not land use tax. The Land 
Appreciation Tax Provisional Enforcement Regulations was issued in December 1993, 
which provided that the tax was imposed on a rise in land price for restraining 
speculation in land. Local governments are opposed to this tax and have scarcely 
carried out it, either, although some of them had already begun to levy land apprecia-
tion fee a few years before the Regulations. While urban construction used to be 
annexed to  state capital construction project and under central control before, it has 
often been entrusted to local governments these days. It is now widely accepted that 
land profits should be retained by local governments as their funds for land develop-
ment and urban construction. 
   Second, land profits indeed mainly depend on foreign direct investment. Nothing 
but foreign investment enterprises were liable for land use fee at first. When domestic 
enterprises and individuals also became liable for it later, as most of them did not have 
enough ability to pay it, government could not help fixing its standard at very low level. 
Under the circumstances like this, enterprises invested by foreign capital are highly 
expected to pay land value directly or indirectly to local government for land use right. 
For example, Shenzhen government has taken formalities of the conveyance of land 
use right for all new urban land since September 1987. In fact, large area has been 
conveyed with no or low charge through negotiation, which can be regarded as an 
actual considerate treatment for domestic enterprises and organizations. Once they 
start joint venture with foreign enterprises, however, they are required to pay the
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difference between negotiation price and market price of land value (Li, 1994, p. 131). 
   Additionally, there are two kinds of property in real estate  market  ; one is 
permitted to be sold only domestically, and the other can be sold not only to domestic 
but also to foreign enterprises or individuals. The former are relatively inexpensive 
and sold on a RMB basis, whereas the latter is expensive and sold on a Hong Kong 
dollar basis (Editorial Committee of Yearbook of Shenzhen Real Estate, 1995). This 
also suggests a possibility that a part of foreign investment is reserved excessively 
through real estate transactions in the region. It seems reasonable to say that these 
systems can be established only in coastal area where there is a great demand of 
foreign enterprises for land. 
   Third, the legislation stated above basically focused on urban state-owned land, 
while on the contrary it did not have any definite provisions on non-agricultural 
conversion of rural collective-owned land for a long time. The Law of Land Adminis-
tration in 1988 provided rough lines concerning township and village construction land. 
In November 1992, the Sate Council's Circular on Issues of the Development of Real 
Estate Industry provided as  follows  :  'Collective-owned land can be transferred after 
it is converted to state-owned land through expropriation in advance. When rural 
collective economic organization invests its collective-owned land property in  acquir-
ing shares and establishes joint enterprise with foreign investor or domestic joint 
enterprise in rural area, it should gain the approval of county level government. But 
it cannot be allowed to transfer the shares which represent invested collectiveowned 
land.' In connection with this matter, Shenzhen government approved that economic 
organization of rural community can develop and lease real estate to others through 
joint businesses with outside investors (Li, 1994, p. 131). 
   There was potential demand for rural collective-owned land  before  ; the demand 
has suddenly actualized in a certain area like PRD by the shift of production function 
of foreign enterprises since the latter 1980's. In spite of the boom of rural land 
development in the 1990's, land system reform on rural collective-owned land was so 
late that it brought about disordered land development and also friction among 
government, local community and foreign enterprise. This point will be discussed 
further in Chapter 4.
3 Urban formation on state-owned land
3.1. Expansion and change of existing cities 
   As an index of urban landscape, Table 1 shows the built-up area at prefecture-
level cities in PRD including Shenzhen. Built-up area (jianchengqu) is defined as  'the 
area where urban buildings and public facilities link together and extend on the whole' 
(General Team of Urban Social Economic Investigation, State Statistical Bureau, 1995,
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Table 1 Built-up Area of Prefectural Level Cities in the Pearl River Delta Region 
                                                        (sq. km)
1978 1981 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Guangzhou 154 162 162 206 218 230 241  24] 182 187 188 188 207
Shenzhen 17 20 48 48 58 59 60 69 71 72 81
Zhuhai 4 4 13 14 18 33 37 38 39 41 56 56
Foshan 9 11 11 13 14 17 19 21 23 23 24 26 27
Jiangmen 7 8 8 10 10 10 13 14 15 15 16 16 18
 Zhaoqing 6 8 7 7 9 12 12 17 15 15 16 18 19
Huizhou 6 7 7  8 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 20 22
Dongguan 8  8 13 13 13 14 14 15 15
Zhongshan 9 12 14 14 14 15 17 15
 Source  : 'Guangdong Province Urban Statistical Data 1987' (1987), and 
       'Annual Statistical Tables on Urban Construction' (1981
, 82, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 
      93).
 p.  517) and includes commercial, residential and industrial areas. Although the 
materials of State Statistical Bureau and the Ministry of Construction (Table 1) do not 
tell any strict definition of the term, it is possible for us to grasp rough trend of the 
expansion of urbanized area. 
   The reason why the primate city, Guangzhou, reduced its built-up area from 1988 
to 1989 is uncertain, but the area has increased again lately. This figure does not seem 
to calculate again the area of recent redevelopment of its old town. Foshan,  Jiang-
men, Zhaoqing and Huizhou, which already became medium-sized cities at the starting 
point of economic reform and open policy, have steadily increased their built-up area 
during these 15 years from 1978 to 1993. The expansion of built-up area in Shenzhen 
and Zhuhai, whose SEZs are the foci of their urban construction, has been quite 
dramatic, which altered the original urban system of the region with an extreme 
concentration upon Guangzhou. In addition, Dongguan and Zhongshan have grown 
markedly since  mid-1980's. Compared with the process of land system reform, 
however, the built-up area of these cities expanded more rapidly in the latter half of 
1980's than in the 1990's when government widely started the transfer of land use right 
and raised more land profit. The expansion of  built-up area in the existing cities has 
not necessarily kept pace with the progress of land system reform or the increase of 
land profits of government. We have to consider not only quantitative aspect of urban 
formation but qualitative one. 
   Fig. 2 indicates the floor space of buildings of capital construction completed in 
Shenzhen SEZ, as a clue to understand the situation of built-up area according to land 
use. Completed space of factory and storage as well as that of residence steadily 
increased through the 1980's, with all a sudden dip in 1986 and 1987. It is likely that
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Fig. 2 Floor Space of Capital Construction Completed in Shenzhen SEZ 
 Source  : 'Statistical Yearbook of Shenzhen' (1993, 94, 95).
Shenzhen SEZ grew as a manufacturing city and built factories and storage, and also 
built houses including accommodations for factory workers during this period. In the 
1990's, while completed space of residence becomes increasingly large, space of factory 
and storage shows downward trend on the contrary. A certain space of commercial 
and service building and office is steadily completed, though its absolute figure is not 
so large. These suggest that Shenzhen SEZ as a city has entered upon a new phase 
when it changes its industrial structure and comes to possess such functions as 
administration and distribution for assisting production in surrounding area.
3.2. Land development at the initiative of government 
   Real estate development enterprises raise necessary capital, besides their own 
capital, by bank loan, foreign investment, domestic investment, advance payment by 
subscription, and so forth. In contrast with this, local government needs to raise 
capital mainly by itself for land development that is prior to real estate development. 
This is partly because government monopolizes urban land development and excludes 
private enterprises from it, except for some comprehensive land development by 
foreign enterprises, and partly because land development is a part of the formation of 
public goods and usually unprofitable in a commercial sense. After all, the capital 
accumulation of local government becomes a principle factor of urban land  develop-
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ment. 
   Government conveys the land use right of state-owned land in urban area, after it 
finishes the relocation of enterprises or inhabitants and settles up the compensation for 
them. Government also needs to readjust the land and furnish basic infrastructure 
before it hands over the land to real estate developer. So called  `qi tong yi ping' 
(opening road, water supply, sewage, electricity, communication, gas and steam, and 
leveling the ground) is a general condition of the hand over in Shenzhen municipality . 
At the same time, land user pays land value (dijiakuan) to government which consists 
of land conveyance price (tudi churangjin), land development fee (tudi kaifafei) and 
construction fee of public facility attached to the land (shizheng peitao sheshi fei). 
   Among three of them, the standard of land conveyance price is decided according 
to the classes by location in the city, such as whether it is close to or far from the city 
center or whether it is within the zone of city planning or not. The classification by 
land use zone, such as commercial, residential and industrial zones, and the adjustment 
by building volume rate are also the factors for the decision of the price standard. 
The alteration range of 20% in maximum to the standard is admitted, so the price is 
left to the government discretion. Terms of land use are provided in general as 70 
years for residential zone, 50 years for industrial zone, and so on. The terms become 
shorter for the cases of conveyance by negotiation. They are provided differently 
among cities. 
   Land conveyance price reflects the differences of location, the differences of land 
use and, to some extent, capital gain expected in a certain term, so that it is akin to 
the general idea of land market price. On the other hand, land development fee 
comprises compensation for relocation by redevelopment as well as construction cost 
of infrastructure, and construction fee of public facility attached to the land asks land 
users to bear a part of construction cost of public facilities. It is quite unique to 
collect these costs as a part of land value. 
   Land profits of Shenzhen government is composed of land value including land 
conveyance price, supplementary land value which is paid when the land originally 
conveyed with no or low charge is again transferred to a third person, land use fee, and 
land appreciation fee. These are all devoted to 'land development funds' (tudi kaifa 
jijin). This is extra-budgetary capital and is exclusively applied to land development 
including the construction of infrastructure, various compensation for enterprises and 
inhabitants whose land is expropriated, and the construction of public facilities. 
Compared with the total amount of budgetary revenue, instead of extra-budgetary 
revenue which is not published yet, the scale of land profits was equivalent to 38% in 
1991, and only land value in 1994 was equivalent to as much as 98% (Editorial 
Committee of Yearbook of Shenzhen Real Estate, 1992, p.  134  ; 1995, p. 48). 
   Table 2 and Table 3 tell us the state of conveyance of land use right in Shenzhen
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Table 2 Conveyance of Land Use Right in Shenzhen SEZ
No. of contracts Area (10,000 sq. m) Land value revenue
Year
Total \1€





auction  10€ RMBHK$US$ 10,000million100  million
1987 3 2  15.73 10.24 5.49 0.35
1988 109 104 5 225.84 221.87 3.97  1.54 978
1989 83 77 6 199.78 194.57 5.21 1.68 310
1990 123 204.04 193.37 10.67 3.98 23
1991 10.38
1992 238 234 4 502.76 14.00
1993 296 295  1 578.58 576.71 1.87 3.31 2,900 3.30
1994 228 188 40 266.26 206.24 60.02 36.99 7.28
 Source  : 'Chinese and Foreign Real Estate Times,  No.  3'  (1990)  , and 
      'Yearbook of Shenzhen  Real Estate' (1991
, 92, 93, 94,  95)  .
Table 3 Methods of Land Conveyance and Land Use in Shenzhen SEZ (1987-1993) 
                                                   (10,000 sq. m)
Negotiation
(exempted)
Negotiation Tender Auction Total (%)
Residence 71.56 202.95 25.24  1.28 301.03 12.9
Accommodation for singles 7.90 33.30 4.03 45.23 1.9
 Office 16.11 13.85 0.36 30.32 1.3
Commercial use 17.25 89.32 0.19 106.76 4.6
Industrial use 159.56 436.63 3.80 599.99 25.8
Storage 5.30 199.47 204.77 8.8
Hotel and inn 3.12 3.25 6.37 0.3
Comprehensive building 10.54 168.83 3.67 0.47 183.51 7.9
Public service 251.05 478.73 729.78 31.4
Others 113.38 5.21 118.59 5.1
Total 655.77 1,631.54 37.29 1.75 2,326.35 100.0
(%) 28.2 70.1 1.6 0.1 100.0
 Source  : 'Yearbook of Shenzhen Real Estate 1995' (1995).
SEZ. The formalities of conveyance have been taken for all new use of state-owned 
land since 1987 and the revenue from land value has been increasing (Table 2). This 
revenue makes a direct contribution to the increase of land development funds, as 
mentioned above. Table 3 indicates that, conveyance which is exempted by negotia-
tion from paying land value, and which is regarded as almost the same as  former 
allocation with no charge, occupies no less than 28% in terms of area. 70% in the 
whole is conveyed at negotiation price, whereas the percentage of conveyance by 
tender and auction at market price is only 1.7%. The percentages of the land which
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is exempted from paying land value are relatively low in the land for commercial use, 
storage and comprehensive buildings. On the whole, however, the decision of convey-
ance price is still dependent on government's discretion, while land market plays only 
partial or indirect role for the decision. 
   What has to be noticed is that a part of government organization, for instance, 
Land Bureau and Construction Committee, directly establish real estate development 
enterprises and make a good income. These  affiliated enterprises of government are 
often regarded as uncommercial ones whose profits from the management of real 
estate are not liable to tax (Wang, 1992, p. 46). Land use right of state-owned land is 
always conveyed from government to these enterprises at a low price arranged by 
negotiation. After developing real estate there, these enterprises sell or lease it at a 
market price mostly to foreign enterprises, and certainly earn a considerable amount 
of income in due course. Moreover, the construction of infrastructure before convey-
ance which government is responsible for is often trusted to these real estate develop-
ment enterprises preferentially. 
   There is one further point that we must not ignore. That is another development 
method by  'rent in kind' (shiwu dizu), which is not added up to the land development 
funds. Government demands that land development enterprises to which land use 
right is conveyed should construct surrounding infrastructure and attached public 
facilities for nothing (Wang, 1992, p. 45). The enterprises are required to shoulder 
some governmental duties. The extra construction cost of the development enter-
prises is compensated by the discount of land value through negotiation, or is added to 
the real estate price which can be finally borne by purchasers of the real estate like 
foreign enterprises. This method is problematic because the accounts of public 
finance as well as the construction costs calculation of development enterprises become 
doubtful. 
   At any rate, we can be fairly certain that government has built a system to 
accumulate capital through charging land and to invest it in urban land development.
4 Urban formation on  collective  -owned land 
   Land system reform was intended for urban state-owned land to begin with. The 
influence of land system reform started extending even to rural collective-owned land 
soon and gave a great impetus to urban formation in rural area. 
4.1. Expansion of non-agricultural land 
   In the first place, we shall now look into the decrease of cultivated land area as an 
index suggesting urban formation in rural area (Fig. 3). Compared with the trend of 
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 Fig.  3 Indices of Cultivated Area  (1980=100) 
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down during 14 years from 1980 to 1994. The decrease of cultivated land in Shenzhen 
municipality (most cultivated land is distributed in former Baoan County, namely, 
Baoan and Longgang Districts at present) was more dramatic. Its area became one 
seventh during the same period of time. It is easy to find that there were two specific 
periods when cultivated land decreased strikingly in  Shenzhen  ; the first one was 
around the middle of the 1980's, the second one was at the beginning of the 1990's. 
Similar movement could also be observed on the whole PRD. 
   In the second place, let us look at the details of cultivated land conversion in 
Shenzhen municipality for the purpose of understanding the reasons for the dramatic 
decrease of cultivated land area (Fig. 4). The decrease in the 1980's was attributed to 
the land conversion to fish pond or fruit garden. It is not to be denied that, with the 
production responsibility system introduced, they pursued more profitable land use 
within agriculture in a wide sense. In the 1990's, the majority of land conversion was 
for non-agricultural land use, such as land for house, factory, and transport. 
   Furthermore, here is a piece of statistical data on land use change in the 1990's of 
Baoan County, or Baoan and Longgang Districts, which was regarded as rural area on 
the outskirts of Shenzhen SEZ (Table 4).  'Cultivated land' and  'water area' decreased 
on the one hand, while 'built-up area' increased more than 40% and 'others' also 
increased sharply on the other hand for the four years. Besides large-scale conver-
sion of cultivated land, a large area of fish and irrigation ponds was filled up for quite
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 Fig.  4 Conversion of cultivated land in Shenzhen 
 Source  :  `Shenzhen National Economic and Social Statistical Data 1979-1985' (1987),  'Shen zhen "7th  Fie-Year Plan" Period  National Economic and Social Statistical Data 
   1986-1990' (1991), and 'Guangdong Agricultural Statistical Yearbook' (1994, 95).
Table 4 Land Use in Baoan 
gang Districts)
County (Baoan and  Long-
 (sq. km)
1990 1994
Cultivated land 183.9 157.7
Garden land 147.9 147.8
Forest land 698.1 668.3
Built-up area 117.8 165.9
Traffic land 55.9 50.2
Water area 152.8 49.7
Others 336.6 444.5
Total 1,693.0 1,692.5
 Source  :
 ̀ Yearbook
of Shenzhen Real  Estate' (1992,  95).
rapid land development during this period in the once rural area. The increased part 
of  'others' contained the land on which anything had not been built yet after leveling. 
According to the data of the whole Shenzhen municipality, 233.7 square kilo metres out 
of 546.9 square kilo metres (total area) was the leveled but unbuilt land (Editorial 
Committee of Yearbook of Shenzhen Real Estate, 1995, pp. 46-47). The land develop-
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built-up area but also the effect that a huge area of leveled land were left without being 
used. 
   Lastly, for further details of the expansion of built-up area, let us look into Fig . 
5a and Fig. 5b on the completed floor space of buildings of fixed assets investment by 
ownership from 1988 to 1994. In Shenzhen SEZ, almost all floor space of buildings was 
invested in by government as capital construction, and only small space was by 
collectives and individuals. As stated in Chapter 3, residential space of capital con-
struction increased quickly those years in comparison with non-residential space . In 
Baoan and Longgang Districts, although the space of capital construction by govern-
ment showed a rising tendency lately, whereas the spaces by collectives and individuals 
were still larger. The lively construction in the 1990's was coincident with the 
expansion of built-up area shown in the land use data above. We can be fairly certain 
that the large non-residential floor space by urban and rural collectives meant fac-
tories and related buildings in their industrial areas. This situation was in marked 
contrast to the floor space by individuals most of which was residential .
4.2. Land profits from land use conversion 
   As  non-agricultural income increases, farmers have looked upon their land not 
only as means of production or social security but also as employable property . This 
change is in concurrent with the increase of demand for non-agricultural land in PRD . 
Since the rural land is owned by local community collectively, when the management 
rights of land are distributed, and moreover, when the profits from land are distributed 
among the members of community, the role of local community has become more and 
more important. 
   The conversions of collective-owned land of rural local community to non-agricul-
tural use are classified into three main cases . The first case is the conversion within 
the community for their own use. According to the Land Administration Law , the 
area of conversion should not exceed the standard provided by provincial government . 
Local community is required to gain the approval of county government after the 
examination of township government on the conversion of land for residence and 
public facilities, and is still required to gain the approval of county government for 
township and village enterprises. If the land is within the area of town planning , 
community is required to gain the approval of municipal government. The land 
ownership does not transfer in this case. 
   The second is the case of land expropriation by state . This case is further divided 
into two  sub-cases  ; one is for capital construction project of government , the other is 
for the transfer of land use right from local community to outside user like real estate 
development enterprise. Even in the latter case, the land ownership should be trans-
ferred from collective to state through the formalities of expropriation .
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   When agricultural land of local community is expropriated, government formally 
pays to local community expropriation compensation which consists of land compensa-
tion, employment subsidy, surface property compensation and young crops compensa-
tion. This expropriation compensation is included in land development fee in land 
value which is paid from new land user to government. In fact, however, new land 
user negotiates directly with local community for the amount of expropriation compen-
sation. In other words, the compensation is not borne by government but by new land 
user, usually real estate developer. The burden of developer may be shifted to the 
price of real estate, so that the compensation is finally apt to be reckoned in the 
investment of foreign enterprises that positively purchase property in industrial estates 
and high-class  residences'''. 
   The third is the case that local community keeps ownership and leases its land or 
invests its land use right in joint venture. It is still necessary for local community to 
gain the approval of county level government or above. Actually, many local commu-
nities actively construct industrial estates at their expense and invite foreign enter-
prises to engage in industrial production. At the same time, they invest their land use 
right in joint venture with real estate development enterprises and build multi-story 
high-class residences in their neighbourhood. Besides these cases, many farmers 
often lease a part of their residential land with buildings on it to the outside users. 
When they build new houses of their own, they often lease their old houses as  offices, 
factories, or accommodations for inmigrant workers from inland area of China or for 
businessmen from Hong Kong to stay there for factory administration. 
   Assuming that foreign investment enterprises use land,  Fig.  6 schematizes the 
transfer of land use right and the flow of capital in the case of state-owned land (A) 
as well as the second (B) and the third (C) cases of collective-owned land stated above. 
These diagrams show that capital flows into government in the case of state-owned 
land, into both government and local community in the case of expropriation of 
collective-owned land, and into local community in the case that collective-owned land 
is leased or invested without expropriation. 
   On the conversion of collective-owned land, we shall now observe more concretely 
the example of L village, X township, Baoan District,  Shenzhen9). L village was 
originally a production team under the system of People's Commune, and a natural 
village later on. It carried out relatively independent management in economic 
aspects and rose to become an  administrative village in 1993. It enjoys its good 
location near the highway and the super highway linking Shenzhen with Guangzhou 
and has a good access to Hong Kong (See Fig. 1). It has been industrializing and being 
populated rapidly in recent years. 
   Land owned by L village was originally over 5,000 mu (1 mu  # 6.67 a), about 80% 
of which was expropriated by government. 10% of the expropriated land was return-
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ed to the village as  'reserved land' (liuyongdi). A part of the land left to the village 
is used by villagers such as residential  land  ; the other is appropriated for industrial 
estate as well as commercial facilities of a joint venture with X township. Compensa-
tion for expropriation of collective-owned land by government started to be paid in 
1988 with RMB 2 million. The compensation paid to L village during 8 years from 
1988 to 1995 was totally RMB 48 million. The standard of compensation was RMB 10 
thousand per mu at the beginning, before it was raised to RMB 15 thousand per mu. 
   Turning now to land lease, rent is set at around RMB 11  tol3 per 1 square meters 
per month. Since land area of two industrial estates of L village is 150 thousand 
square meters, its rent income is about RMB 22 million per year. Consequently, total 
land profits from compensation related to expropriation and rent of industrial land 
come up to RMB 30 million per year. 
   In addition to the land profits, the village has the income of processing fees based 
on the contracts of  'sari lai yi bu' (three types of processing and one compensation), 20 
million Hong Kong dollars totally per year, which is paid from foreign investors to 
village-run enterprises. After all, the total income of L village amounts to about 
RMB 50 million every year, all of which is to be transferred to village's local commu-
nity reserve. The reserve is managed by village's economic organization, Shenzhen 
Baoan L Industrial Co., Ltd.
4.3. Distribution of local community reserve 
   We observed previously that the land profits of village have become a significant 
source of revenue for local community reserve. This will lead us further to a consider-
ation of how community reserve is used. 
   In general, community reserve is managed under  'share cooperation system' (gufen 
hezuozhi) of local community. Share cooperation system of local community initially 
aimed at both collecting surplus money in each peasant's hand to raise capital for new 
businesses of community and clarifying vague ownership relations of common prop-
erty in community. The system comes to have another role to distribute community's 
large amount of profits to village people recently in PRD. While a certain part of 
community reserve is appropriated for the construction of social overhead capital in 
village, the other part is distributed to each village people according to his or her 
holdings of share. At the end of  1992,98 out of 121 administrative villages and 356 out 
of 378 natural villages in Baoan and Longgang Districts had already put share coopera-
tive system into operation (Li et  al., 1994, pp. 7-8). 
   Shenzhen Baoan L Industrial Co., Ltd. mentioned above functions as the principal 
part of share cooperative system in L village. The share  of  this company is composed 
of collective and individual shares; the former occupies 52%, the latter 48%. Individ-
ual share is given only to the villagers who are registered as local people, and is
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permitted to transfer only within the village community. Company's regulations 
stipulated that profits are divided to  'public accumulation funds' (gongjijin),  'public 
welfare funds' (gongyijin),  'premium welfare funds'  (jiangli fulijin) and  'dividend funds' 
(fenhong  jijin)  ; their ratios are 30-35%, 10-20%, 3-8% and 35-55% respectively. 
Some village cadres say, however, that the distribution ratio between collective to 
individual was 7 to 3, but that the ratio became 3 to 7 after 1993, that is to say, the ratio 
is regulated flexibly and the percentage of individual distribution has actually been 
increasing these years. This is because the construction of village's social overhead 
capital has already gone well and now it is not so necessary for the village to reserve 
a lot of funds for further construction. 
   As for the construction of social overhead capital, L village has invested RMB 16.5 
million in leveling cultivated land and fish ponds, constructing equipment for road, 
water supply, sewage, electricity, communication, and so forth, and building facilities 
for health, law and order, culture and entertainment, and fire service as well . The 
village also has constructed industrial estates since 1987 and equipped by itself basic 
infrastructures for production. 
   The village built in advance standardized factories and dormitories plus other 
facilities supporting production. More than 50 factories have already moved in the 
two industrial estates and are administrated by Economic Development Company of 
the village. Besides, the village invested its reserve or land use right through the 
company in the joint venture projects of commercial center with X township. It built 
multi-story high-class residence jointly with real estate development enterprises. 
   The village invested RMB 40 million and built 158 detached houses on the land of 
80 thousand square meters in 1992. 70% of the investment was from community 
reserve and 30% from village people. All houses had the same arrangement of rooms 
 basically  ; each house was provided to about 4 village people in principle. It seems 
that the village tried to utilize its limited land efficiently by building houses together 
at one place, and moreover, laid a stress on equal welfare of its people as a community. 
The community reserve is partly appropriated to education funds, purchase of endow-
ment insurance, and medical expenses at a clinic in the village. 
   Let us, for the moment, consider how much weight is given to the individual 
distribution of community reserve in each family budget of village people. Income of 
village people consists of 4 sources. The first is income from traditional callings, 
namely, agriculture in a broad sense. All cultivated land had been lost by 1990 in L 
village, and only scanty shrimp farming is carried out nowadays. The second is 
income from non-agricultural occupations. Some go into business for themselves, 
some are employed and paid. Many village people are engaged in the administration 
of village organizations such as villagers committee, village-run enterprises, and other 
organizations of public services for villagers. The third is the distribution of commu-
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nity reserve through share cooperative system. The fourth is rent income from 
property occupied by individuals (e.g. their former houses). 
   The agricultural income firstly mentioned above holds quite little portion in total 
income now. On the contrary, the distribution through share cooperative system, the 
third source, occupies a very important position. It was RMB 13 thousand per every 
person in L village in 1995, which exceeded remarkably the average wage of employee 
in Baoan County (RMB 8,779 in 1994). It is safe to say that, while income from non-
agricultural occupation depends upon individual or family conditions, the disparity of 
the distribution of community reserve among the village members is not so large. It 
enables the village to keep its unity and tackle new businesses or constructions as a 
community. Needless to say, some people succeed to start their own new business. 
Unfortunately we have no definite data on income from individual real estate 
mentioned above as the fourth source. 
   So far, we have seen how community reserve is distributed and used. A certain 
part of the reserve is invested in the construction of industrial infrastructure, factories, 
and other buildings in industrial estates. Commercial centres and high-grade resi-
dences are developed also. Another part is invested in social overhead capital for the 
daily life of village people. Village people, who are rich with dividend, build houses 
for their own use. Viewed in this light, we may reasonably conclude that the flow of 
foreign capital into the region and the movement of charging land have caused capital 
accumulation of local community and promoted brisk urban formation even in rural 
area.
4.4. The issue of  'historical land' 
 `Historical land' (lishi yongdi)
, in Shenzhen SEZ, is the land which has been 
occupied by public bodies, enterprises and individuals since pre-SEZ period. Shenzhen 
SEZ was founded in August 1980. The historical land, just like the land allocated by 
government with no charge after the foundation of SEZ, can not be allowed to change 
its land use nor be admitted to be mortgaged or transferred. When one leases the land 
with an approval of land bureau sub-office, he or she is are required to pay 6% of rent 
to the land development funds of municipal government. Land use fee for this type of 
land is also imposed as heavily as the allocated land with no charge (Editorial 
Committee of Yearbook of Shenzhen Real Estate, 1995). 
   Outside SEZ, on the other hand, the Provisional Measure upon Planning and Land 
Administration of Baoan and Longgang Counties, Shenzhen Municipality was issued in 
July 1993, and local governments commenced uniform land administration for the first 
time. They call the cases 'the issues of historical land' (lishi yongdi  yiliu wenti) where 
rural local community developed land, transferred rights on land, invested land as 
capital in joint venture and changed land use without any County level or higher
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government's approval. The authorities issued the Transactional Measure upon the 
Issue of Historical Land in March 1994 in Longgang County , in September 1994 in 
Baoan County, and began to tackle the issue. 
   Take the Transactional Measure upon the Issue of Historical Land of Baoan 
County for example. When a local community develops land and transfers it to a 
third person without any approval from the authority , if the new land use is inconsist-
ent with town planning, then buildings should be demolished and the ownership of the 
land should fall into government's hand with no compensation to anybody. If there is 
no inconsistency between the new land use and town planning , the person to whom land 
is transferred is required to go through the formalities of conveyance and to pay the 
land value to government which is determined by its location and land use . When 
local community invests its land in a joint venture without any approval from the 
authorities, the counterpart of local community in the joint venture (mostly foreign 
enterprise) is required to pay land value to government, whereas local community is 
exempted from it. If the area exceeds the limit of non-agricultural construction land 
permitted to the local community, the community also has to pay some land value by 
a standard which is set lower than the counterpart's standard. All land value and 
penalty levied by the Measure are added to land development funds, 40% of which is 
assigned to townships and appropriated to the construction of their public facilities . 
   Land ownership arranged in accordance with the Measure is confiscated by state , 
but no compensation is paid to anybody. The Measure also stipulates that the 
economic disadvantage caused by the arrangement should be readjusted between the 
parties concerned, that is, a local community and its partner enterprise. According to 
some interviews in Baoan County, however, there are not a few troubles in the 
readjustments. Although foreign enterprises signed contracts with local communities 
and paid considerable  'transfer price' of land before, they are now suddenly required 
by the Measure to pay again land value or penalty to government nevertheless . Such 
measure is far from acceptable to them. Local communities , on the other hand, have 
already used up the land profits which they obtained through the contracts . For 
instance, they invested the profits in the construction of village's social overhead 
capital and the development of village-run businesses, or distributed them to village 
people as dividend. Local communities can no longer shoulder the burden immediate-
ly. 
   This issue reflects an intention of government to try to control land development 
and use completely even in rural area. The Measure has some consideration that the 
burden of local community by the arrangement is reduced in comparison with that of 
foreign partner, and that a part of the land revenue is paid back to townships , actually. 
Yet its main purpose is for government not to let local community monopolize the land 
profit but to secure a part of the profit. To put it the other way round, land rent was
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not levied enough in rural area before the Measure, so that foreign enterprises could 
use land at lower price. It is likely that such advantage of rural area will be 
diminishing in the near future as the Method is executed more strictly.
5 Conclusion 
   I would like to summarize the mechanism of urban formation that is stimulated by 
land system reform in conclusion. Furthermore, I shall point out some questions left 
for the region. 
   Land was used with no charge and with no term of use before the reform. Land 
use was not effective and capital for land development was strictly limited. Govern-
ments commenced land system reform in the 1980's, which led to the formation of land 
market and promoted effective land use. At the same time, they started on ac-
cumulating capital for urban land development. Land development funds from gov-
ernment's land profits have made a large contribution to the expansion of urban area 
and the restructuring of urban function. 
   Local community has chiefly carried out its land development in rural area. Land 
profits such as compensation fee for land expropriation and rent for land property have 
played a significant role of accumulating capital for rural land development. 
   Locational conditions which foreign enterprises need for their production are not 
only inexpensive and abundant labour force but also inexpensive and abundant land 
and infrastructure for production and transportation with a certain standard. Every 
local community in rural area competitively supplies a large area of land by the 
conversion of their agricultural land and invests its capital accumulated as community 
reserve into land development for the purpose of inviting more foreign investment. 
Rural area is behind urban area in the progress of land system reform, so it was slow 
for government to extend its control on land by rent collection or town planning 
toward rural area. This situation is also an advantageous factor for rural commu-
nities to become production bases of foreign enterprises. As a result, a circulation of 
capital from foreign investment through local capital accumulation to land develop-
ment has come to existence in rural area. A part of community reserve is invested in 
social overhead capital related to daily life and another part is distributed to village 
people through share cooperation system and invested in their own housing. All of 
these have been changing 'rural' landscape. 
   Lately, however, the mechanism of urban formation stated above is under the 
pressure of modification. 
   After the boom of real estate investment by foreign investors, mainly of Hong 
Kong, roughly from 1992 to 1994, the real estate came to be in oversupply in PRD. It 
seems reasonable to suppose that local (county level) governments in PRD, which are
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authorized to convey state-owned land, recklessly released land use rights without 
considering market trend in the keen competition for direct investment of foreign 
enterprises. In addition to local governments, an increasing number of local commu-
nities in rural area also became the supplier of land use rights. Each community 
scrambled to convert agricultural land and carried out land development even if its 
locational conditions are poor. There was little control of the authorities over such 
movement. 
   The control of government over land market tends to become stronger recently. 
In order to reduce surplus property and activate real estate market again, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou took desperate measures to suspend the conveyance of  state-owned 
land temporarily. The disposition of historical lands stated in Chapter 4 chiefly aims 
at recovering the authorities' control over collective-owned land in rural area. A 
cadre at Planning and State Land Administration of Shenzhen municipality told me 
that the decision on the amount of land conveyance is now rationally based on town 
planning, supply and demand, and financial revenue. However, it will be necessary in 
the near future to construct a new system to regulate land supply adequately from a 
viewpoint of wider region like PRD for preventing excessive and chaotic competition 
of land development. 
   Land demand in PRD has been dependent on the shift of production function of 
foreign enterprises into the region since the 1980's. It is clear that the direct invest-
ment of foreign enterprises has been a driving force of land development there. At the 
same time, such investment has played an important role for capital accumulation of 
local governments and communities in the region under the new land system. This 
situation basically remains unchanged at the moment. We can safely state that the 
urban formation of PRD still depends on an external factor — the behavior of foreign 
enterprises on investment from a global viewpoint. In this sense, the mechanism of 
urban formation in the region seems unstable in the long run.
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Notes
1) The Pearl River Delta region (PRD) indicates  the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone' for 
  convenience in this paper, which was designated by Guangdong Provincial Committee and 
  Government in October, 1994. It covers administratively Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
  Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Foshan, and Huicheng District, Huiyang, Huidong, 
  Boluo in Huiyang City, and Duanzhou District, Dinghu District, Gaoyao, Sihui in  Zhaoqing 
  City, whose area is 41,596 sq. km, and 23.4% of all Guangdong Province. 
2) Over the past few years, several articles have pointed out the similar patterns of urbaniza-
  tion in Asia including China. See McGee (1991), Ma (1994), Zhang and Wu (1993), and 
  Woo (1994). 
3) Calculated on the data in State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China (1995, p. 55) 
  and The Communist Party of China Guangdong Provincial Office Administrative  Depart-
  ment & Guangdong Statistical Bureau Administration Department (1995, p. 5). 
4) See He (1993, p. 53). As He (1993) describes, community reserve was originally spent for 
   the daily operation of local community, for instance, the management expenses of 
   ancestral temple. In the 1970's, government made rural communities assume a part of 
   expenditure, for example, wages of school teachers and cadres at the basic level, adminis-
   trative expenses, and so on, to which they appropriated their own community reserve. 
   Since the economic reform commenced, community reserve has added to importance as 
   funds for productive activities of local community by township and village enterprises.
   Since land system reform spread in rural area, community reserve has become a strongbox 
   saving land profits of local community, as we shall see later in Chapter 4. 
5) Now in China, the transfer of land use right is divided into two stages; one is 'churang' 
   which means government's direct sale of land use rights to land users, and the other is    
'zhuanrang' which means the sale of land use rights between land users . This paper uses 
   a word 'conveyance' for  `churang' and  'transfer' for  `zhuanrang' respectively, abiding by 
  the translation policy in Institute of Finance and Trade Economics Chinese Academy of 
   Social Sciences and Institute of Public Administration New York U.S.A. (1992, p. 372). It 
   also uses the word 'transfer' for general meaning comprehending both two stages. 
6) Wang (1992, pp. 26-28) quotes a case in Shanghai municipality that the standard of land 
   use fee dropped a few times. 
7) Local governments have no incentive to levy land use tax a portion of which is taken 
   away by central government, so that they reduce tax rate and enlarges the scope of tax 
   exemption. For example, in Guangzhou municipality, revenue from land use fee of more 
   than 80 million yuan dropped to 63 million yuan after switching to land use tax (Wang, 
   1992, pp. 29-30). 
8) In the case of land expropriation for  capital construction projects, the new land user is 
   government. Especially in Guangdong where governments expropriate a large area of 
   land for many large-scale projects, compensation fee which should be paid to local
   communities in rural area becomes a burden to government. Then, land within 10% of 
   expropriated land is returned to local communities as a supplement to the compensation.
   The land is called  'liuyongdi' (reserved land). Although the ownership of reserved land 
   belongs to the state, local community holds its  land use right and can transfer or lease it 
   to others. Local community also can establish a real estate company and take part in the
   development and management of the land. See Chen at  al. (1994, p. 11). 
9) The observations concerning L village, X township were based on field research conducted 
  in June 1995 and July 1996.
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